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In the public debate about improving corporate governance practices, the issue of combining the functions of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board received considerable attention in recent years. From a theoretical perspective, strong agency-theoretic arguments advocating a separation of decision and control functions in large corporations are flawed by practical arguments stressing the benefits of a combined function. Also, as discussed below, the empirical evidence focusing on U.S. companies is not conclusive. In this context empirical evidence from a country with a different practice of CEO succession and a much higher percentage of firms maintaining a permanent leadership structure with separated functions may provide important new insights with respect to the question whether one leadership structure should generally be preferred to the other one.
We fill this gap by investigating the valuation effects of leadership structure for a sample of 152 Swiss firms, among which, in 2002, only 29 firms -or 19.08% -maintained a combined function while the rest of the sample separated the functions of the CEO and chairman. In Switzerland, the "Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance" became effective in July 2002. In contrast to the Bacon Report in the U.S. and the Cadbury Report in the U.K., the Swiss Code of Best Practice does not recommend the separation of the two functions explicitly. Rather it requires the companies to "provide for adequate control mechanisms" if "for reasons specific to the company or because the circumstances relating to availability of senior management makes it appropriate", the firm decides to combine the two functions. Nevertheless, in Switzerland the percentage of firms with separated functions is approximately 80% and remained fairly constant over the past 10 years.
Consistent with prior U.S. studies, we found no evidence of a systematic and significant difference in firm value between firms with combined and firms with separated functions. We also investigated whether firms with a poor corporate-governance structure are more likely to combine the two functions or whether, in contrary, firms with a combination of the two func-tions systematically use alternative governance mechanisms to counter-balance potential agency costs associated with their leadership structure. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, we found a similar curvilinear relationship between leadership structure and managerial shareholdings as between Tobin's Q and managerial shareholdings. Thus, possible agency costs associated with a combination of the functions are mitigated by a higher incentive alignment of the CEO/chairman through an adequate level of managerial shareholdings.
In light of the empirical evidence on the relation between leadership structure and firm value, the question arises whether regulatory efforts are the most efficient way to prompt firms towards the appropriate leadership structure. Another potentially more important mechanism, which may direct firms to choose the appropriate leadership structure, is the capital market. In fact, over the last few years corporate governance became an important investment criterion, which is for example reflected in the emergence of various corporate governance ratings.
Moreover, a large body of academic literature on the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value emerged during the last few years. The majority of research finds that firms with better firm-level corporate governance rankings and disclosure standards exhibit higher Tobin's Qs.
In this article, we also investigate whether firm value is significantly related to firm level corporate governance as measured by a broad survey-based index for a representative sample of Swiss firms. Consistent with prior research, we document a strong positive relation between our corporate governance index and firm value: Looking at the median firm, a one standard deviation increase in the corporate governance index causes an increase of the market capitalization by at least 12 percent of a company's book asset value. This result is robust to possible endogeneity, i.e., our analysis confirms that causation runs from corporate governance to firm value, but we also find evidence of reverse causality, with higher valued firms adopting better corporate governance practices.
Regulatory Environment and Common Practice
Many countries have adopted codes of best practice only recently to establish guidelines for listed companies and to improve the overall quality of corporate governance. One issue that receives considerable attention and prompts regular controversies is the practice of combining the functions of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board. In the U.S. for example, the "Report of the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise" issued on January 9, 2003, recommends that the CEO and chairman functions are separated and the position of the chairman is filled by an independent director. Already in 1992, the "Bacon Report on Corporate Boards and Corporate Governance" commissioned by the Conference Board recommended a separation of the CEO and chairman functions. Still, the percentage of firms with combined functions remained on a high level of approximately 80% of all large U.S. firms over the last two decades. In the U.K., the "Cadbury Report", which strongly recommends a separated leadership structure, was issued in 1992. It is argued that the Cadbury report, which had a strong impact on U.K. governance practices in general, is one possible reason for the large decline in the fraction of U.K. firms with combined functions from 51.6% in 1985 to 9.8% in 1995.
2 More recently, the "Review of the Role and Effectiveness of non-Executive Directors", authored by the well-known British investment banker Derek Higgs and commonly referred to as the "Higgs Report", recommends not only the separation of the CEO and chairman positions but also that the chairman should be required to meet the standards of independence. 80%. Hence, the question arises whether the prevailing leadership structure in Switzerland reflects a long tradition, or whether it represents a recent trend due to increased pressure exerted by company regulators, shareholder activists, the press, and investors at large. To answer this question, we provide some information on the evolution of leadership structure of 
Shareholder Proposals and the Nestlé Case
Over the last few years, an increasing number of U. only, which gives him the opportunity to exercise his double-function for five years.
While it is true that the Swiss Code does not prohibit a combination of the two functions, it stipulates that the company must establish adequate control mechanisms. In this respect, having the CEO and chairman as a member of the remuneration committee represents a serious conflict of interest. Moreover, Nestlé maintains a voting limit restriction where voting rights are capped at 3 percent of the company's capital, which is a significant limitation of the company's governance structure. After all, one gets the impression of a poor succession planning on the level of the board of Nestlé, because Gut's mandatory demission was not an unexpected event.
Even though the shareholder proposal requesting the separation of the CEO and chairman functions at Nestlé did not pass, it is an important milestone in Switzerland's corporate governance discussion: It is arguably one of the first occasions on which shareholders organized themselves and demonstrated their disapproval of a company's decisions on the CEO and chairman succession. Moreover, the fact that P. Brabeck decided to resign from Nestlé's remuneration committee shows that the received 36% of the votes did not leave the company's decision makers completely unimpressed.
Dual Duality: The Case of Fritz Gerber
There is an impressing Swiss case which highlights that the combination of the CEO and chairman functions is (1977 -1981 ), Credit Suisse (1978 -1996 , Nestlé (1981 -2001 ), and IBM Corp. (1989 -1996 . Not enough: He also served as a colonel in the Swiss army during this time period. 
The Academic Debate on Separating Management and Control
Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen were among the first to argue that agency costs in large organizations can be reduced by a separation of decision management from decision control and that the board of directors is only an effective device for decision control if it limits the decision discretion of top managers. to the independent chairman as the non-CEO chairman is given enormous power, which again can be used to extract rents from firm. These costs can be reduced when the chairman holds equity in the firm.
2) There are information costs of transferring critical information between the CEO and the chairman. As a result of his function, the CEO presumably possesses considerable specialized knowledge, which is also valuable to the chairman. Hence, a separation of the two functions requires a costly and possibly incomplete transfer of information between the CEO and chairman.
3) While a combination of the two functions creates a clear-cut leadership and potentially a more rapid implementation of decisions, a separation of the CEO and chairman functions might create the potential for rivalry between the two title holders. At the same time, a separation of the functions can make it more difficult to assign blame for bad company performance.
4) In the U.S., other potentially important costs are related to the common succession process of CEOs. In many firms with combined functions the CEO/chairman first passes the CEO title to his successor while retaining the chairman title during a probationary period in order to allow the board to monitor the new CEO on the job and to provide assistance and pass on important information to the new CEO. After the probationary period, the new CEO typically is assigned the additional title of chairman and the old chairman resigns from the board. The prospect of being promoted to chairman potentially provides important incentives to new CEOs, which are lost if a firm maintains an independent chairman.
Based on these arguments, it is unclear whether combining or separating the functions is beneficial to the firm and its shareholders. Both types of leadership structure are associated with different benefits and costs and the optimal choice depends on the relative weights of those. Moreover, since the benefits and costs associated with different leadership structures can vary across firms, so may the optimal leadership structure as well. Hence, the question whether the costs associated with combined functions outweigh the benefits is an empirical one. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is also mixed. Some authors document that firms with separated functions outperform firms with combined functions, while other authors find exactly the opposite result. 9 However, the majority of research finds no statistically significant difference in performance between firms with different leadership structures. 10 Based on Michael Jensen and William Mecklings's framework of organizational structure, a possible explanation for these mixed findings could be that most firms have reached the optimal structure 9 See, for example, Lynn Pi and Stephen G. Timme, "Corporate control and bank efficiency," Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 17 (1993) a long time ago and only depart from it when some of the cost components change. 11 Hence, no differences in performance should be observed between different leadership structures and no abnormal stock returns should be realized on the day when a change in the leadership structure is announced. Consistently, there is evidence that firms do consider the costs and benefits of alternative leadership structures: A recent U.S. study finds that organizational complexity and CEO reputation increase the probability of combining the two functions.
Similarly, a combination of the two functions is more likely when insider ownership is relatively large and the board is small. 12 Based on these findings, pushing all firms to separate the CEO and chairman functions may be counterproductive and legislative reforms forcing separated functions may be misguided.
Leadership Structure and Firm Value in Switzerland
As the empirical evidence focusing on U.S. companies is not conclusive, empirical evidence from a country with a different practice of CEO succession and a much higher percentage of firms maintaining a permanent leadership structure with separated functions may provide important new insights with respect to the question whether one leadership structure should generally be preferred to the other one. In this section, we investigate whether firms with combined or separated functions differ systematically from each other and provide some evidence on the relation between leadership structure and firm value for a sample of 152 Swiss firms in
2002.

The Data
To identify a firm's leadership structure, we specified a dummy variable CEOCHAIR, which is equal to one if the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board of direc- 14 We excluded three firms for which the value of Tobin's Q, our measure of firm value, exceeds the mean value by more than three standard deviations, two firms with a leverage ratio bigger than one, and three firms for which the value of the return on assets is falling short of the mean value by more than three standard deviations. 
Do Firms with Combined and Firms with Separated Functions Differ from each other?
Before addressing the effect of leadership structure on firm value, we used a multivariate probit regression framework to analyze whether firms with combined differ systematically from firms with separated functions. As the agency costs of a combination of the functions may be eased by alternative corporate governance mechanisms that help to align the interests of the CEO/chairman and the shareholders, we included the five corporate governance mechanisms along with a set of five control variables in this analysis. The control variables are: firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, average annual growth of sales over the past three years (2000) (2001) (2002) , R&D intensity calculated as R&D expenses over sales, profitability as measured by the ratio of operating income to total assets, and a dummy variable whether the company is issuing American Depositary Receipts.
The results are reported in Column 1 of cient on SHAREOD is statistically insignificant in Column 1, we now find evidence of a curvilinear relationship between CEOCHAIR and SHAREOD. Hence, on average firms with combined functions exhibit managerial shareholdings close to the optimal level. In fact, we find a maximum of 27.2% based on a probit and 30.0% based on a linear probability model for the relation between CEOCHAIR and SHAREOD, which is close to the value of 37.6%
reported by McConnell and Servaes (1990) for the relationship between managerial shareholdings and Tobin's Q in the U.S. and the maximum value of 37.3% for our Swiss sample as reported in the next section. This result suggests that possible agency costs associated with a combination of the two functions are mitigated by a higher incentive alignment of the CEO/chairman through adequate managerial shareholdings.
However, it is important to notice that SHAREOD comprises the shareholdings of all officers and directors. As a leadership structure with combined functions is especially vulnerable to entrenchment by the CEO/chairman, it would be particularly interesting to investigate the shareholdings of the CEO/chairman in firms with combined functions and compare them to those of CEOs and chairmen in firms with separated functions. While Swiss firms are not obliged to report individual shareholdings of the CEO and/or chairman of the board, the requirement to disclose all shareholdings exceeding 5% allows us to construct a variable SHAREOD5% including all block shareholdings of individuals holding either the CEO title, the chairman title, or both. In fact and consistent with our hypothesis, the results in Column 3 of Table 1 reveal that the probability of having a combination of the two functions is positively associated with SHAREOD5% indicating that CEO/chairmen are more likely to hold substantial blocks of their "own" companies' shares than CEOs and chairmen in firms with separated functions.
We summarize the results of this section as follows: We find no evidence that firms with a poor corporate-governance structure are more likely to have combined functions. In contrary, firms with combined functions seem to counter-balance potential agency costs evolving from their leadership structure: The curvilinear relation between CEOCHAIR and SHAREOD indicates that possible agency costs associated with a combination of the two functions are mitigated by a higher incentive alignment of the CEO/chairman through managerial shareholdings.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Leadership Structure and Firm Value
We finally investigated the valuation consequences of leadership structure in a multivariate OLS framework in order to control for other potentially important determinants of firm value besides CEOCHAIR. In the first regression specification, we included six control variables.
Two variables aim to control for growth opportunities: firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and average annual growth of sales over the past three years (2000) (2001) (2002) . 20 We expect a positive relationship between past growth and Q and a negative influence of firm size on Q, because growth opportunities tend to be lower for larger firms. To control for firm-specific knowledge and growth opportunities, we included R&D intensity.
Based on simple valuation models, Q may additionally depend on profitability as measured by the return on assets and the company stock's market beta. Finally, to control for industry ef- combined CEO-chairman function may be mitigated by the use of alternative corporate governance mechanisms.
The results for the two specifications can be found in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, To investigate whether the affiliation of the chairmen who do not serve as CEOs has valuation effects, we disaggregated the variable CEOCHAIR = 0 into four dummy variables, depending whether the chairman is a 1) former CEO of the firm, 2) major shareholder, 3) (co-)founder of the firm or belongs to the founding family, or 4) a representative of another company which is a major shareholder of the firm. We included the four dummy variables into the regression equation reported in Column 5 of Table 1 . However, all four coefficients are insignificant while all other coefficients remain basically unchanged. The coefficient on the dummy variable whether the chairman is a major shareholder has the lowest p-value (0.27) and is the only negative coefficient out of the four. This indicates potential private benefits of control associated with a chairman who is a major shareholder of the firm.
nally, the light gray line displays the predicted probabilities that a firm combines the two functions based on the marginal effects of the probit estimation reported in Column 2 of Table   1 . The relation between CEOCHAIR and SHAREOD reaches a maximum for SHAREOD equal to 27.2% based on the probit model, and 30.0% based on the linear probability model.
The value of SHAREOD which maximizes Q is 37.3%. Approximately 86.8% (93.4%) of the sample lies in the ownership range of 0% to 50% (0% to 60%).
23
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In summary, consistent with the majority of prior research on leadership structure in the U.S., the evidence in this section reveals no systematic and significant difference in firm value between firms with combined and firms with separated functions. Moreover, the finding of a significant curvilinear relationship between Tobin's Q and SHAREOD and a similar relationship between CEOCHAIR and SHAREOD suggests that possible agency costs associated with a combination of the two functions are mitigated by a higher incentive alignment of the CEO/chairman through an adequate level of managerial shareholdings.
The Emergence of Corporate Governance Ratings
In light of the empirical evidence provided above, the question arises whether regulatory efforts are the most efficient way to prompt firms towards the appropriate leadership structure.
In fact, one should expect that the capital market is a potentially important mechanism which may direct firms to choose the appropriate leadership structure. From a theoretical point of view, agency problems affect the value of firms through the expected cash flows accruing to 23 To further investigate the nonlinear relation between CEOCHAIR and SOD as well as Q and SOD, we additionally estimated piecewise regressions as suggested by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) . Besides their original breakpoints of 5% and 25%, we tested a series of alternatives including 10% and 30%, 15% and 35%, as well as 20% and 40%. Most importantly, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. However, the results are consistent with those reported in Columns 2 and 5 of Table 1 as the coefficients on the different piecewise SOD-variables follow the pattern suggested by Figure 2 and always exhibit the same sign for CEOCHAIR and Q (with one expected exception as the maximizing value of SOD is somewhat smaller for CEOCHAIR than for Q).
investors and/or the cost of capital. Specifically, agency problems make investors pessimistic about future cash flows while good corporate governance decreases the cost of capital to the extent that it reduces shareholders' monitoring and auditing costs. With the emergence of corporate governance ratings, a firm's corporate governance developed from a "soft" concept to an important and established investment criterion. 24 For example, a study released by
McKinsey and Company in 2002 reports that investors are willing to pay an average premium of 14% for the stock of well-governed companies. Similarly, a large body of academic literature on the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value emerged during the last few years. The majority of research finds that firms with better firm-level corporate governance rankings and disclosure standards exhibit higher Tobin's Qs.
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In this section we investigate whether firm value is significantly related to firm level corporate governance as measured by a broad survey-based index for a representative sample of Swiss firms. Switzerland is a particularly interesting case to analyze. The institutionalization of shareholdings, i.e., the accumulation of stocks by professional asset managers, had strong effects on the structural changes of the equity market after pension plans became mandatory in the mid-eighties and emerged as the major domestic investment force thereafter. Moreover, in the course of globalization of equity markets many restrictions protecting the management of Swiss firms were abandoned, such as restrictions on the transferability or ownership of shares ("Vinkulierung") or multiple share classes with limited or unequal voting rights. These developments make it interesting to investigate the role of specific control mechanisms in more detail.
The Construction of a Corporate Governance Index for Switzerland
The corporate governance index (CGI) is based on responses to a detailed questionnaire, which refers to the recommendations in the Swiss Code of Best Practice. The survey was sent out to all Swiss firms quoted at Swiss Exchange (SWX) with the exception of investment companies and was completed between May and July 2003. When necessary, the data was supplemented and verified consulting annual reports and web pages. The survey consisted of 38 questions/attributes in five categories: (1) corporate governance commitment, (2) shareholders' rights, (3) transparency, (4) board of directors and executive management, and (5) auditing and reporting. To qualify for inclusion, an attribute must refer to a governance element that is not (yet) legally required. All attributes can be initiated and implemented by a firm's decision makers.
The construction of the index is straightforward: First, firms were asked to indicate their acceptance level by assigning a value between 1 (minimum) and 5 (maximum) to each question.
One point is added for each subsequent acceptance level on this five-scale answering range. A higher acceptance level is interpreted as an (earlier) active move by the firm's decision makers to improve its corporate governance system. Second, we computed the simple sum over all 38 questions. While such a simple weighting scheme makes no attempt to accurately reflect the relative importance of the individual governance attributes, it has the advantage of being transparent and easy to interpret. Finally, the index was normalized to have a value between 0 and 100, with better-governed firms having higher index levels.
120 out of 235 firms returned the questionnaire, which implies a response rate of 51.06%. We had to drop 11 firms due to insufficient data leaving a final sample of 109 firms for the analysis in this section. The distribution of the index is displayed in Figure 3 . The mean of CGI is 58.46 and the median 59.21, indicating a relatively symmetric distribution. Not surprisingly, the blue chip firms included in the Swiss Market Index (SMI) have significantly higher values of CGI than the other firms in our sample. Additionally, Figure 3 reveals that there are substantial differences in firm-level corporate governance between the 109 firms in our sample: the minimum value is 25.00, and the maximum value is 90.13.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: A Problem of Endogeneity
Given that a firm's decision makers can choose from a broad menu of alternative corporate governance mechanisms, one may suspect that there are substitution effects. Specifically, the greater use of one mechanism needs not be positively related to firm performance, and where one mechanism is used less, others may be used more, resulting in equally good performance.
Hence, the existence of alternative governance mechanisms and their likely interdependence make ordinary least squares regressions that relate the use of any single governance mechanism to firm performance difficult to interpret. We tried to avoid a potential missing variables bias and control for possible interrelationships between the different corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin's Q by including in the analysis additional mechanisms that are not contained in the index. They are specified by the following variables: the percentage of voting rights exercised by the largest shareholder (LSHARE), the percentage of cumulated voting rights exercised by true outside blockholders (BLOCKOUT), i.e., non-group listed companies, mutual funds, and pension funds with voting rights exceeding 5%, the number of directors on the board (BOARDSIZE), the percentage of outside members on the board (OUTSIDER), and firm leverage (LEVERAGE).
To take into account a possible endogeneity of our corporate governance index (CGI), the five additional governance mechanisms, and Tobin's Q, we specified a simultaneous equations system where each governance mechanism is the dependent variable in one of the equations. [Insert Figure 4 about here]
The system was estimated using three-stage least squares (3SLS). For sake of brevity, we abstain from reporting the results in a table; they are discussed in more detail in our European Financial Management article. 26 We find strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that corporate governance is positively related to firm value. Specifically, for the median firm, a one standard deviation increase in the corporate governance index causes an increase of the market capitalization by at least 12 percent of a company's book asset value. It turns out that this effect is about six times stronger in the 3SLS system than in a simple OLS setting. As it is hard to find persuasive arguments for such an enormous difference, we are hesitant to exactly quantify the valuation impact of improved governance standards, and interpret the (biased)
OLS coefficient on CGI as a lower limit. 27 Our results further reveal that neither the presence of a controlling shareholder nor large (outside) blockholders have a significant valuation impact. We also found statistically significant effects between the governance mechanisms which highlights the endogeneity issue and justifies the simultaneous equations approach. For example, firms with a controlling shareholder tend to have larger boards and a smaller fraction of outside directors, indicating private benefits from sitting on the board.
Conclusions
In the past years, many countries have adopted guidelines or rules to improve the quality of corporate governance for listed companies. One field of enduring controversies among practitioners and academics is the practice of combining the functions of the CEO and the chairman of the board. Agency-theoretic arguments advocating a separation of the functions are flawed by practical arguments stressing the benefits of a combined function. In addition, the empirical evidence from U.S. companies is not conclusive. We therefore supply evidence from a country with a different practice of CEO succession and a much higher percentage of firms with separated functions. We analyzed this issue within the context of the general governance structure of firms, as reflected by the various governance mechanisms available to the shareholders. Despite of the institutional difference between the two countries, our results are consistent with the empirical findings for U.S. firms: We found no evidence of a systematic and significant difference in firm value between firms with combined and firms with separated functions. We also investigated whether firms with a poor corporate governance structure are more likely to have a combination of the two functions or whether, in contrary, firms with combined functions systematically adopt alternative governance mechanisms to counterbalance potential agency costs associated with a combination of the two functions. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, we found a similar curvilinear relationship between leadership structure and managerial shareholdings as between Tobin's Q and managerial shareholdings.
Apparently, potential agency costs associated with a combination of the two functions are mitigated by a higher incentive alignment of the CEO/chairman through an adequate level of managerial shareholdings.
In light of these empirical findings, the question arises whether regulatory efforts are the most efficient way to improve their leadership structure, or whether the capital market provides the relevant incentives. We therefore investigated whether firm value is significantly related to the quality of corporate governance as measured by a broad survey-based index. We controlled for reverse causality between the index, some additional (or complementary) governance mechanisms and firm value (Tobin's Q) by estimating a system of simultaneous equations by 3SLS. We found strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that our corporate governance index is positively related to firm value. In contrast, neither the presence of a controlling shareholder nor large outside blockholders have a significant valuation impact.
Two implications emerge from our analysis: First, the existing empirical evidence does not support arguments advocating a legal or statutory separation of the CEO-chairman leadership functions in publicly traded firms. Companies can chose their own "mix" among alternative control mechanisms to restrict the potential damage for shareholders' wealth. In this perspective, there is no case for observing a valuation discount or to require regulatory actions. Second, our results highlight the pivotal role of the capital market for providing incentives to improve governance standards. This does not imply that investor protection and prosecution capabilities are useless. Although the task of reforming investor protection laws and improving judicial quality is a lengthy process that requires the support of many interest groups, it seems like a worthwhile objective in the public interest. However, once adequate disclosure and transparency standards are in place, our empirical results suggest that it is ultimately the capital market that rewards good governance practices and punishes bad ones. In other words, corporate governance should be understood as a chance rather than an obligation from the perspective of a firm's decision makers. This table presents estimates from probit regressions of CEOCHAIR on different corporate governance mechanisms and control variables (Columns 1 to 3). Columns 4 and 5 report OLS regressions of Tobin's Q on a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEOCHAIR), different corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. Included control variables in Columns 1 to 5 are: firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, average annual growth of sales over the past three years (2000) (2001) (2002) , R&D intensity calculated as R&D expenses over sales, and profitability as measured by the ratio of operating income to total assets. Columns 1 to 3 additionally include a dummy variable whether the company is issuing American Depositary Receipts and Columns 4 and 5 the company stock's market beta. The sample size is 152. The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-sided tests. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
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Exogenous Control Variables
The company's market beta, the number of outside shareholders with an equity stake >5%, a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, a dummy variable whether the company paid out a dividend in 2002, the ratio of intangible to total assets, a dummy variable whether the CEO or chairman was a founder of the company, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, the natural logarithm of the age of the firm, average annual growth of sales over the past three years (2000) (2001) (2002) , the return on assets, a dummy variable whether the company has different share categories with different voting rights attached, a dummy variable whether the company belongs to the Swiss Market Index, a dummy variable whether the state owns >5% of the company's equity, the standard deviation of stock returns, and 13 industry dummy variables
